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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20050415-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State has failed to meet its burden in this case. It has neither asserted a 
compelling government interest Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 was designed to serve, nor 
demonstrated that the statute is necessary to serve a compelling interest. The State also 
does not argue that the communications fraud statute is narrowly tailored to meet any 
compelling interest. Rather, the State admits the statute is broad and embraces the 
unlimited prosecutorial discretion it bestows. However, the State could not meet these 
burdens in any event, because the government has no compelling interest in proscribing 
harmless conduct, and the plain language of the communications fraud statute reveals that 
it is not narrowly drawn. 
Nonetheless, the State urges this Court to take the unprecedented action of 
applying the constitutional analysis for civil defamation to a criminal statute that 
admittedly proscribes harmless non-defamatory speech. While relying on case law that is 
inapposite to the facts here, the State selectively ignores established legal precedent that 
provides the appropriate authoritative template for analyzing the constitutionality of a 
criminal statute regulating speech, such as §76-10-1801. Accordingly, the State's 
arguments are flawed and the communications fraud statute is invalid for facial 
overbreadth. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN. 
A. THE STATE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT §76-10-1801 
SERVES A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST OR 
THAT IT IS NARROWLY DRAWN TO ACHIEVE THAT END. 
As outlined in Martinson's opening brief, because the communications fraud 
statute regulates speech, the State must meet the twofold burden of showing that (1) the 
statute serves a compelling government interest, and (2) it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992). The State has not only ignored 
both of these burdens, but has effectively conceded the point, as the following analysis 
proves. 
As the State concedes, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is not aimed only at fraud. 
See, e.g., BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ("Br. Resp.") at 15. It proscribes any falsehood made 
for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from another, regardless of whether the 
communication is relied upon or even taken seriously, or if the desired result is harmless. 
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"To survive strict scrutiny . . . a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest 
- it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest." Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. at 199. The State does not even assert that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
1801 serves a compelling government interest, much less demonstrate that it has one. 
This omission is understandable but fatal to the State's position. 
But what is affirmatively stated in the State's brief is even more fatal. Rather 
than demonstrate that the statute is necessary to serve a compelling state interest, the State 
effectively concedes there is not one: 
"[Falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly are not protected, 
whatever the object of the fraud. It is therefore irrelevant how the statute limits 
the object of the fraud. Whether the object of the fraud is a kiss, a vote, avoiding 
arrest, or some other thing of arguable value is irrelevant, because an intentional, 
knowing, or reckless falsehood is not protected." 
Br. Resp. at 15. The forgoing quotation speaks for itself. Herein the State concedes that 
even harmless falsehoods, such as those discussed in Martinson's opening brief (BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT at 17, 18,19, 22, 31, 32, 33) are proscribed by §76-10-1801. There is no 
precedent for the State's claim that the government can proscribe and prosecute harmless 
speech. There is certainly no compelling interest in doing so. 
The State also does not address the "narrowly tailored" requirement, and again 
concedes in the foregoing quotation that the communications fraud statute broadly 
criminalizes all falsehoods regardless of the value sought. The State's argument that such 
overbreadth is acceptable is incorrect. "Even if a statute . . . aims at penalizing an 
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unprotected class of speech, it 'must be carefully drawn to be authoritatively construed to 
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected 
expression.'" Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372,1375 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)). 
Because the State has not refuted but has rather embraced the unlimited 
discretion bestowed by the broad provisions of §76-10-1801, there is no need for 
Martinson to reargue here that the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve any 
legitimate government interest. 
In short, the State has failed to meet its burdens, effectively conceding that the 
communications fraud statute serves no compelling government interest and that the 
statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Therefore, this Court 
should reject the State's arguments and find that §76-10-1801 is facially overbroad. 
B. THE STATE IGNORES LAW THAT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
ARE RESERVED FOR HARMFUL BEHAVIOR AND ASSERTS 
THAT HARMLESS SPEECH MAY BE PROSECUTED. 
The State is asking this Court to create an unprecedented standard in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. As previously shown, the State concedes that §76-10-1801 
proscribes harmless falsehoods, but then argues that it can.1 This argument ignores and 
contradicts binding case law cited throughout Mattinson's opening brief demonstrating 
'"Whether the object of the fraud is a kiss, a vote, avoiding arrest, or some other 
thing of arguable value is irrelevant, because an intentional, knowing, or reckless 
falsehood is not protected." Br. Resp. At 15. 
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not only that criminal statutes regulating speech must be narrowly drawn to serve a 
compelling government interest, but they must also be justified by the existence of some 
imminent harm the state seeks to prevent.2 These principles cannot be simply ignored as 
the State suggests. Otherwise, the danger exists that an "expansive, content-based 
[statute] restricting speech [will be] invoked only where there is no other valid basis for 
arresting an objectionable or suspicious person[, such as occurred in this case]. The 
opportunity for abuse . . . is self-evident." Logan City v. Ruber, 786 P.2d at 1376 
(quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 136 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Thus, in the context of a criminal statute, a compelling interest equates to the prevention 
of some imminent harm. 
The State does not claim that it seeks to prevent any imminent harm; it simply 
argues that it can prosecute any falsehood made with the requisite intent. The State 
makes this "I do, because I can" argument because it cannot refute the anomaly that even 
harmless speech is subject to criminal sanctions under the overly broad provisions of §76-
10-1801. Therefore, the State concedes the falsehood, "You don't look fat in that dress" 
is subject to the whims of prosecutorial discretion whether the value sought from another 
is a kiss (a second degree felony) or the price of a dress (likely a class B misdemeanor). 
2See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass % 
436 U.S. 447 (1978); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenckv. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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As previously shown, criminal statutes regulating speech must be narrowly 
tailored to address an imminent harm or a compelling interest. The State does not 
acknowledge or address this long-standing principle or any of the authoritative precedent 
Martinson cites in his opening brief, which is the template that must be applied in 
analyzing the constitutionality of any criminal statute that regulates speech, such as §76-
10-1801. This omission is again fatal to the State's position because no meaningful 
analysis can occur with the very precedent establishing the parameters for criminal 
statutes regulating speech excluded from the discussion. 
The State inaccurately claims Garrison v. Louisiana3 supports the unprecedented 
application of the civil defamation standard established in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan4 to a criminal statute regulating non-defamatory speech. Br. Resp. at 12-14. 
Garrison is inapposite to the facts of this case and makes no such claim. 
Garrison stands for the narrow proposition that any statute regulating 
defamatory speech of public officials should be scrutinized under the standard established 
in Sullivan. Garrison does not hold that all criminal statutes regulating speech should be 
measured by the Sullivan standard.5 The State's selective citations from Garrison must 
3379U.S.64(1964). 
4376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
5If Garrison did support the State's position, it would have overruled all of the 
precedent on point cited in Mattinson's brief, and more. However, none of that precedent 
has been overruled by Garrison. 
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be examined in their true context, which the State has not provided. 
The true context of Garrison is not only illuminating, but in reality, supports 
Martinson's position. The issue in that case was whether, in view of the different 
histories and purposes of criminal and civil libel statutes, Sullivan's civil defamation 
standard also limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of public 
officials. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 67. The Supreme Court held that Sullivan 
limits state power to regulate defamatory speech involving public officials in any context. 
Id. at 68 (overturning Louisiana's criminal libel statute because it violated the First 
Amendment and criminalized protected speech). 
Unlike Garrison, the communications fraud statute is not limited to speech 
critical of public officials. This case also does not subject a criminal libel statute, such as 
that at issue in Garrison, to constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, Garrison does not apply 
here, at least not for the purpose the State intends. 
However, the fundamental First Amendment principles outlined in Garrison not 
only do apply here, but they end the debate, particularly regarding the imminence of harm 
as an unequivocal requirement for any criminal statute regulating speech to survive 
constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court stated: 
"Changing mores and the virtual disappearance of criminal libel prosecutions 
lend support to the observation that ' . . . under modem conditions, when the rule 
of law is generally accepted as a substitute for private physical measures, it can 
hardly be urged that the maintenance of peace requires a criminal prosecution for 
private defamation.' Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 924 (1963). The absence in the Proposed 
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Official Draft of the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute of any 
criminal libel statute on the Louisiana pattern reflects this modern consensus. 
The ALI Reporters, in explaining the omission, gave cogent evidence of the 
obsolescence of Livingston's justification: 
'"It goes without saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified merely by 
the fact that defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways that 
entitle him to maintain a civil suit. Usually we reserve the criminal law 
for harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community's sense 
of security. . .. It seems evident that personal calumny falls in neither of 
these classes in the U. S. A., that it is therefore inappropriate for penal 
control, and that this probably accounts for the paucity of prosecutions 
and the near desuetude of private criminal libel legislation in this country. 
. . . ' Model Penal Code, ent. Draft No. 13, 1961, §§ 250.7, Comments, at 
44." 
Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added). 
Thus, under Garrison, even the indisputable harm of defamation is not deemed 
of such pernicious character that criminal sanctions are justified. Yet ironically, the State 
in this case relies upon Garrison to support its claim that criminal liability should be 
imposed even for harmless conduct. This claim is obviously not supported by Garrison. 
In holding the Louisiana criminal libel statute in Garrison unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court specifically focused on the fact that the statute created criminal liability 
without harm, or breach of the peace, and further criticized the Louisiana court's rejection 
of the "clear and present danger" test, noting this rejection was also indicative that the 
statute was not narrowly drawn.6 
6
"The Reporters therefore recommended only narrowly drawn statutes designed to 
reach words tending to cause a breach of the peace, such as the statute sustained in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, or designed to reach speech, such as group 
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Therefore, the sole case that the State presents as supporting authority for its 
novel claim that the First Amendment does not protect harmless speech contradicts the 
State's own position. Garrison is expressly limited to the context of speech critical of 
public officials, and in fact repeatedly refers to the standard set forth in Sullivan as the 
"public official rule."7 Indeed, Garrison explicitly rejects the State's arguments. 
Garrison not only requires that a criminal statute regulating speech be directed to 
imminent harm, but it neither imposes the New York Times v. Sullivan standard upon 
vilification, 'especially likely to lead to public disorders,' such as the statute sustained in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. But Louisiana's rejection of the clear-and-present-
danger standard as irrelevant to the application of its statute,... coupled with the absence 
of any limitation in the statute itself to speech calculated to cause breaches of the peace, 
leads us to conclude that the Louisiana statute is not this sort of narrowly drawn statute." 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 70 (some citations omitted). 
7
"We recognize that different interests may be involved where purely private libels, 
totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned; therefore, nothing we say today is to be 
taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitutional guarantees in the 
discrete area of purely private libels." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 73, n. 8. 
"We find no difficulty in bringing the appellant's statement within the purview of 
criticism of the official conduct of public officials, entitled to the benefit of the New York 
Times rule." Id. at 76. 
"The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an 
official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The public-
official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the 
people concerning public officials, their servants." Id. at 76-77. 
"Applying the principles of the New York Times case, we hold that the Louisiana 
statute, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, incorporates 
constitutionally invalid standards in the context of criticism of the official conduct of 
public officials." Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
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criminal statutes regulating non-defamatory speech nor rejects the "clear and present 
danger" doctrine. Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's arguments and find 
that §76-10-1801 is facially overbroad. 
C. THE STATE MISINTERPRETS BINDING FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHING THE PROPER ANALYSIS 
FOR CRIMINAL STATUTES THAT REGULATE SPEECH. 
The State claims the Martinson's reliance on Schenck v. United States8 and its 
progeny is misplaced. Br. Resp. at 15. However, the State provides no thoughtful 
analysis demonstrating how it reached this conclusion.9 The State cites Brandenburg v. 
Ohio10 for the idea that the incitement test "only applies to laws that forbid the advocacy 
of violence or the violation of the law." Br. Resp. at 16. None of the cases cited by the 
State so hold. Therefore, the State's conclusion is wrong. However, because Schenck 
and its progeny summarily defeat the State's arguments, the State's only recourse is to 
8249U.S.47(1919). 
9The State cites a concurring opinion from Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), which cites Schenck as authoritative 
precedent. Moreover, while mildly criticizing Schenck for not providing enough 
protection for speech protected under the First Amendment, the Court stated in its main 
opinion, "The history of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, however, is one of 
continual development, as the Constitution's general command that 'Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,' has been applied to new 
circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior principles and precedents. The 
essence of that protection is that Congress may not regulate speech except in cases of 
extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we have not elsewhere 
required." Id. at 740. The State further cites a footnote from a 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision, which cites Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. 
,0395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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wrongly argue they don't apply. 
While it is certainly true that legal principles are fluid and continually evolving 
to fit times and circumstances, none of the cases Martinson cites in his opening brief 
relative to the correct First Amendment analysis to be applied in the context of a criminal 
statute has been overruled. See, fn. 2, supra. The principles behind the "clear and present 
danger" test remain constant. "Properly applied, the test requires a court to make its own 
inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular 
utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the 
need for free and unfettered expression." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829, 842-843 (1978). 
The State has failed to address the voluminous case law articulating the 
fundamental principles that must be considered when analyzing any statute that seeks to 
regulate speech, including without limitation the principle that "the possible harm to 
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the 
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to 
fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes." Broadrick v. 
OMa.9 413 U.S. 601, 612-613 (1973). 
Therefore, rather than analyze §76-10-1801 under the appropriate First 
Amendment standard, the State disingenuously concludes from dicta taken out of context 
that the standard does not apply. Thus, the State circumvents legal principles established 
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by First Amendment jurisprudence while urging this Court to hold that the State may 
prosecute any falsehood, harmless or otherwise, whether the value sought is a kiss, the 
sale of a dress, or the assurance that a critically ill friend will obtain proper medical 
treatment. Because the State refuses to apply the appropriate standard developed by a 
long line of First Amendment jurisprudence, the State's arguments are flawed and lack 
the proper constitutional framework necessary for cogent analysis. However, if the State 
did apply the appropriate standard in its analysis, it would be forced to concede the issue. 
The communications fraud statute's facial overbreadth is manifest both by its 
plain language and under the controlling law on point. Therefore, the statute should be 
deemed overbroad on its face and this case should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner, Richard Jeremy Martinson, respectfully requests this Court to find 
that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is facially overbroad, and to thereby vacate his 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this ( j ^ day of December, 2005. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
c ^ 4 
Jennifibr K. (rowans 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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